CITATION: Tou’s Garden Pty Ltd v
Redline Automotive [2010] NTMC 038
PARTIES: TOU’S
GARDEN PTY LTD
v
DERRECK
FRANZ SPERRER T/AS REDLINE AUTOMOTIVE
TITLE OF COURT: Local
Court
JURISDICTION: Small
Claims
FILE NO(s): 20938319
DELIVERED ON: 26
May 2010
DELIVERED AT: Darwin
HEARING DATE(s): 25
May 2010
JUDGMENT OF: J
Johnson A/JR
CATCHWORDS:
MOTOR
VEHICLE – COST OF REPAIRS – MUST NOT BE EXTRAVAGANT OR UNREASONABLE
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr Quin
Defendant: Mr Sperrer
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: N/A
Defendant: N/A
Judgment category classification: C
Judgment ID number: [2010] NTMC 038
Number of paragraphs: 21
IN
THE LOCAL COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN
TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
No. 20938319
BETWEEN:
TOU’S GARDEN PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND:
DERRECK FRANZ SPERRER T/AS REDLINE
AUTOMOTIVE
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 26 May 2010)
Mr j johnson a/jr
The Issue Stated
1.
In
September 2008 the plaintiff entrusted the repair of a Volkswagen Caravelle
(“the vehicle”) to the defendant automotive repair business. The vehicle is
relatively aged, being a 1985 year model with 222,778 kilometres on its
odometer and, I am told in evidence by the defendant automotive repairer, is
unusual in that it has a water-cooled engine. The vehicle was ultimately
repaired by the defendant for a total tax invoiced cost of $7,478.46.
2.
The
plaintiff has paid $2,000.00 by way of “deposit” for the repair work thereby
leaving $5,478.46 in outstanding payment due. The plaintiff takes exception to
the total cost of repair and asserts in its Statement of Claim that “The
defendant failed in their duty of care to contain costs in the repair”.
3.
So it is that an impasse has arisen between
the parties: the vehicle remains in the possession of the defendant pending
payment of the outstanding cost of repairs; and the plaintiff claims the return
of the vehicle subject to payment of a lesser amount of $3,067.48 against the
outstanding amount of $5,478.46.
The Law
4. In Stocovaz v Fung [2007] NSWCA 199, Handley AJA observed, inter alia, (and with references omitted) that:
36. The claimant submitted that the answers to
questions 2(i) and 2(ii) were inconsistent. Considered in isolation this may
appear to be the case. However the questions and answers must be read with his
Honour’s reasons for judgment. His Honour treated extravagant and unreasonable as
synonymous in this context. This was also the understanding of Dr Lushington in
The Pactolus (1856) Swab 173,
which his Honour referred to. Ever since courts and commentators have
treated extravagant and
unreasonable in this context as interchangeable. The
authorities and texts which establish this are summarised in his Honour’s
judgment.
37. In my judgment the answers to question 2
can be reconciled when one bears in mind that there may not be a single fair
and reasonable cost for repairing a damaged motor vehicle, especially a
Mercedes costing $95,563 new. There is likely to be a range of costs all of
which are fair and reasonable. In such a case acceptable evidence that a lower
cost would be fair and reasonable cannot of itself establish that a higher cost
was outside the range and not fair and reasonable.
38. The true question would be whether the cost
incurred was outside the range. In my judgment this is only another way of
asking whether the cost incurred was extravagant or unreasonable.
5.
On
my reading of that authority, a number of key issues of relevance to the
present dispute emerge. Firstly, in assessing cost of repairs to a vehicle the
Court must look to what is “fair and reasonable” or, put another way, whether
such cost is “extravagant or unreasonable”. Secondly, there is likely to be a
range of costs all of which are fair and reasonable. And, thirdly, acceptable
evidence that a lower cost would be fair and reasonable cannot of itself
establish that a higher cost is outside the range and not fair and reasonable.
6.
In
my view therefore the plaintiff must prove, on the ordinary civil standard of
persuasion, that the subject cost of repair is “outside the range” and,
thereby, “extravagant or unreasonable”, albeit that in this context those words
are “interchangeable”.
The Evidence
7.
The
thrust of the plaintiff’s argument as to the cost of repairs being “outside the
range” founded upon 3 principal assertions. These were, firstly, that the
defendant had charged 14 hours labour to “remove engine, strip, inspect and
quote” (exhibit “D4”). This, in the plaintiff’s submission, was an “error of
judgement”. The defendant ought to have recognised at a very early stage that
the engine was beyond economic repair and it was “extravagant” to incur that
amount of labour to arrive at such an explicitly obvious conclusion.
8.
Secondly,
the plaintiff asserted that the hourly rate charged by the defendant ($85.00
per hour) was “too expensive” and offered in support that a specialist diesel
engine repair service which he utilised in the course of his business charged
only $80.00 per hour for an arguably more specialised and complex engine repair
service.
9. Thirdly, the plaintiff attempted to establish that during the repair period the defendant’s mechanics were largely “unsupervised” and that their “effectiveness” or “productivity” was, thereby, questionable. The argument proceeded, as I understood it, upon assertion that the defendant was absent for a significant part of the repair period; that he employed mechanics on so-called “457 Visas”; and that the repairs were used as a “filler job to book hours to”. The sub-class 457 visa program is, as I understand it, the most commonly used program for employers to sponsor overseas workers to work in Australia on a temporary basis.
10.
The
plaintiff, by vehicle of its Statement of Claim, offers to pay $3,067.48
against the outstanding cost of $5,478.46. The methodology for arriving at that
figure is detailed in a letter to the defendant dated 2 August 2009 (not
exhibited). The plaintiff subsequently made a further offer of compromise to
the defendant but the defendant has stood firm in its demand for payment of the
“documented” cost of repairs.
11.
The
defendant’s evidence was that, upon inspection, the subject engine exhibited
significant corrosion and a “weeping head”. This was said to have been caused
by poor attention to coolant and coolant system maintenance and, because the
engine had aluminium “blocks” and “heads” held by steel “studs”, this resulted
in significant aluminium oxidisation of the blocks and heads and corrosion of
the steel studs. Thus it was very difficult to remove the engine and strip it
down for the purpose of assessing its reparability. In support of this
contention the defendant put into evidence a copy of the Jobcard for the repair
showing a breakdown of the total number of hours (by date and time) spent in
removing, dismantling and inspecting the engine (exhibit “D3”). As I understood
that evidence, the actual time spent (after allowing for meal breaks) was in
the vicinity 24.6 hours but the plaintiff had only been charged for 14 of those
hours (exhibit “D4”). At the end of that process the defendant issued the
plaintiff with a Tax Invoice which, when ultimately amended, amounted to
$1,602.70 including, inter alia, GST, towage fees, and the 14 hours
labour.
12. Once the engine had been dismantled, it was the defendant’s evidence that he obtained 2 quotes for specialist repair of the damaged engine components but, in his view, these were not economic so he sought and received approval from the plaintiff to replace the engine with a newly reconditioned “long motor”. He asked the plaintiff to pay a deposit on such reconditioned engine but by the time such deposit was paid the first engine he had found at a price of $2,000.00 was no longer available and he had to purchase a second at an increased price of $2,500.00 plus freight to Darwin and, as it was on an “exchange” basis, freight for the return of the old engine.
13. Once the exchange motor had been received, the defendant incurred a further 12 hours labour in refitting it to the vehicle and fitting it with accessories. There was some dispute as to the need for some of those accessories, but as I understood the evidence, most of the accessories from the plaintiff’s old engine were either not compatible with the replacement engine (water pump) or required repair to return them to service (alternator). At the end of this process a further Tax Invoice was issued to the plaintiff in the amount of $5,875.76 with GST, and which included $2,500.00 for the replacement engine, freight costs, and $1,020.00 for labour (12 hours).
14. Finally the defendant asserted that, contrary to the submissions of the plaintiff, he had only been absent for a short period (1 week) during the repair and that of a total of 15 staff which he employed only 2 were on “457 Visas”.
Findings
15. Upon
a thorough review of the evidence before me I am comfortably satisfied that the
cost of repairs to the plaintiff’s vehicle is not “extravagant or unreasonable”
or, indeed, “outside the range” as I understand the meaning of those terms in Stocovaz
v Fung [2007] NSWCA 199
(see paragraph 4 above). Whilst there was nothing adduced in evidence before me
that I might properly describe as independent expert evidence, the parties to
the proceeding were frank in their submissions and the documentary evidence was
sufficient in my view to enable me to undertake a thorough and proper analysis
of the claim.
16. I
accept the defendant's evidence that, given the age and relatively distinctive
type of vehicle to which the repairs were required, those repairs were both
more difficult and more time consuming than might otherwise have been the case
and that they were clearly not outside the acceptable industry range (exhibit
“D5”). I did not detect that the defendant was otherwise than a competent
automotive repair business or that it had any motive to charge other than the
legitimately incurred reasonable cost of repairs.
17.
For
its part, the plaintiff was clearly unhappy with the final cost of repairs. Its
evidence was that the market value of the subject vehicle at the completion of
repairs was in the order of $3,000.00 to $5,000.00 and, thus, that the vehicle
was beyond “economic repair”. However, there is no dispute that the plaintiff
authorised the defendant both to commence repair of the vehicle and to purchase
a reconditioned motor for which the plaintiff paid a $2,000.00 “deposit”.
18.
Similarly,
in February 2009 the defendant sent to the plaintiff Tax Invoice No. 1801
(exhibit “D4”) which was subsequently amended. Attached to that Tax Invoice was
a type-written note which offered a clear choice to the plaintiff in terms that
“If you do not want to continue with the job, let me know and we will drop the
car back to your place”.
19. Whether
or not the vehicle was beyond “economic repair” is therefore, in my opinion,
not to the point in circumstances where the plaintiff, by payment of a
“deposit”, continued to authorise repairs and ignore the defendant’s offer not
to continue with the job.
Summary
20.
In
summary I have found, on the balance of probabilities, that the cost of repairs
to the plaintiff's vehicle is not unreasonable or outside the industry range
for a vehicle of that age and condition. Upon that basis it is my view that the
plaintiff has not satisfied the legal burden upon it sufficient to succeed in
its claim and the claim must therefore be dismissed.
Order
21. The
plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
Dated this 26th day of May 2010
_________________________
Julian Johnson
Acting Judicial Registrar