CITATION: Australian Fisheries Management Authority v
Farrell [2010] NTMC 001
PARTIES: AUSTRALIAN
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
v
MICHAEL
PHILLIP FARRELL
TITLE OF COURT: Court
of Summary Jurisdiction
JURISDICTION:
FILE NO(s): 20920642
DELIVERED ON: 5
January 2010
DELIVERED AT:
HEARING DATE(s): 18
November 2009
JUDGMENT OF:
CATCHWORDS:
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Prosecution: Mr McCarthy
Defendant: Mr Hopgood
Solicitors:
Prosecution: Commonwealth
DPP
Defendant: Cocks
Macnish
Judgment category classification: B
Judgment ID number: [2010] ntmc 001
Number of paragraphs: 35
IN THE court of SUMMARY JURISDICTION
AT
TERRITORY OF
No. 20920642
[2010] NTMC 001
BETWEEN:
AUSTRALIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
Plaintiff
AND:
MICHAEL PHILLIP FARRELL
Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 5 January 2010)
Ms
1.
The defendant is charged that between 23 January
2009 and 16 February 2009 he committed an offence pursuant to s 105C(1) of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth)
(“the FMA”). The defendant
has pleaded not guilty to the charge and has raised two matters as preliminary
points prior to the taking of evidence.
Submissions were made and written submissions provided. I reserved
decision on the preliminary issues. This is now the decision on the preliminary
issues.
2.
Section 105C is contained with Division 5A of
the Fisheries Management Act. This division is entitled ‘Offences in
places beyond the AFZ’ (that is the Australian Fishing Zone). Section
105C reads:
(1) A person is
guilty of an offence if:
(a) the person intentionally uses an
Australian-flagged boat for fishing; and
(b) the boat is in the exclusive economic zone,
territorial sea, archipelagic waters (as defined in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea) or internal waters of a foreign country and
the person is reckless as to that fact; and
(c) the law of the country requires the person
to have an authorisation (however described) given under the law of the country
for the fishing and the person is reckless as to that fact.
(2) The offence is punishable on conviction by
a fine not more than 500 penalty units.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply if the person
has an authorisation (however described) issued under the law of the country
for the fishing.
(4) The only burden of proof that a defendant
bears in respect of subsection (3) is the burden of adducing or pointing to
evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the matter in question
existed.
(5) If the person has been convicted or
acquitted in the foreign country of an offence involving the fishing, the
person cannot be convicted of an offence under this section involving the
fishing.
3.
The charge alleges that at a specified position
in the waters between Australia and Indonesia the defendant did intentionally
use an Australian-flagged boat, namely the ‘Territory Spirit’ for
fishing, that the said boat was in the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia and
the defendant was reckless as to the fact that the boat was in the Exclusive
Economic Zone of Indonesia and that the law of Indonesia required the defendant
to have an authorisation given under the law of Indonesia for the said fishing
and the defendant was reckless as to the fact that the law of Indonesia
required him to have an authorisation given under the law of that country for
the fishing. The charge is being dealt with
summarily and has a maximum penalty of a fine of not more than 500 penalty
units ($55,000).
4.
The two preliminary issues raised by the
defendant will be dealt with in turn.
5.
1. The
Exclusive Economic Zone issue. Both
prosecution and defence provided detailed written submissions with respect to
this issue. Notwithstanding the fact
that defence have suggested this is a preliminary issue, it is my view that
this issue cannot be resolved prior to the finding of certain facts, which in
turn can not be made until after evidence has been taken. Defence have provided
the Court with a map with a marking as to where they say the Territory Spirit
was located at the relevant date and time.
It is my view that this issue cannot be resolved as a preliminary issue
and I do not make any rulings with respect to this question. To do so would mean making findings on
elements of the charge before evidence is received. I note that prosecution did
not expressively argue that this point should not be dealt with as a preliminary
issue, though they opposed defence submissions.
Nevertheless, as the tribunal of fact, it is my view that this issue
ought be dealt with following the taking of evidence. The issues raised by
defence will then be canvassed.
6.
2. The
Constitutional validity issue. This
issue relates to the validity of s105C of the Fisheries Management Act (Cth).
The prosecution is being conducted in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction
of the
7.
Notices pursuant to 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) were forwarded
to the Commonwealth Attorney-General and the Attorneys-General of the States
and Territories. I am satisfied there
was time for the Attorneys-General to consider the notice. Most have replied
and in particular I note the Solicitor-General for the
8.
It is convenient to set out the terms of the
Notice under s 78B of the Judiciary Act (Cth)
1903 as the notice succinctly sets out the issue raised by the defendant.
1. The accused gives notice that the above
proceedings involve matters arising under the Constitution or involving its
interpretation within the meaning of s 78B of the Judicial Act 1903 (Cth).
2. The accused is charged with an offence
under s 105C(1) of the Fisheries
Management Act 1991 (Cth) (the Act) in that it is alleged between 23
January and 16 February 2009, as master of the Australian-flagged vessel
‘Territory Spirit’, he used the vessel for fishing in the exclusive
economic zone of Indonesia without the necessary permit and was reckless as to
that fact.
3. The accused claims that s 105C(1) is
invalid and inoperative in the circumstances insofar as it purports to confer
the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament upon the legislature and
government of a foreign power, namely the Republic of Indonesia (Indonesia)
contrary to the Constitution.
4. The accused claims that to the extent
that s 105C(1) of the Act operates:
(a) by virtue of s 105C(1)(b) to allow the
geographic extent and ambit of criminal liability under that provision to
expand or contract according to the dimensions of the purported
“Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia” prescribed at any time by
the legislature and government of Indonesia; and/or
(b) by virtue of s 105C(1)(c) to permit a
relaxation of that liability according to any fisheries permit system operating
from time to time as prescribed and provided by the laws of Indonesia.
s 105C(1) entails an
impermissible delegation or abdication of the legislative power of the
Commonwealth to that foreign power.
5. In consequence, s 105C(1)(b) and (c) are
not “laws of the Commonwealth” authorised by ss 51, 52 or 122 of
the Constitution and are therefore of no legal effect in constituting an
offence capable of binding the accused or authorising the issue of the
Complaint in the instant proceedings.
6. Insofar as the accused claims that s
105C(1)(b) and (c) are beyond the legislative competence of the Commonwealth,
this is a matter arising under and involving the interpretation of the
Commonwealth Constitution and therefore a matter to which s78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) applies.
9.
During oral submissions, defence submitted that
this was a matter which could be determined in the Court of Summary
Jurisdiction. Correspondence was then received by the Court from the defendant’s
solicitors wherein it was acknowledged that there is a practice in lower and
intermediate Courts of avoiding the determination of constitutional issues
unless necessary. It was also submitted
in the correspondence that the Court of Summary Jurisdiction has power pursuant
to s 162 of the Justices Act 1928
(NT) to refer any point of law for the consideration by the Supreme Court of
the Northern Territory. It was suggested
that it may be appropriate for this question to be reserved and a Case Stated
to the Supreme Court.
10.
Section 162 of the Justices Act sets out as follows:
(1) The Court may, at discretion, reserve any
question of law arising on or out of the hearing or determination of any
information or complaint for the consideration of the Supreme Court, and state
a special case or cases for the opinion of the Court.
(1A) Any such question may be so reserved at any
time during the hearing of the information or complaint, or at any time within
one month after the Court of Summary Jurisdiction has finally determined the
information or complaint.
(2) The Supreme Court shall deal with every
such special case according to the practice of the Supreme Court on special
cases, and may make such order thereon (including any order as to the costs of
the proceedings in that Court and in the Courts below) as to the Supreme Court
appears just.
(3) The Supreme Court may send any such special
case back for amendment, or may itself amend it.
(4) The Justices shall make a conviction or
order in respect of the matters referred to the Supreme Court in conformity
with the certificate of the Supreme Court.
11.
Section 105C of the FMA creates an offence for
an Australian-flagged boat to fish in certain waters of a foreign country when that
foreign country requires the person to have an authorisation to undertake
fishing and no such authorisation has been obtained (and there are mental
element aspects of the offence as well).
There is a defence to the charge if a person has an authorisation issued
under the law of the relevant foreign country for the fishing in the
Australian-flagged boat. It may be the
case that the relevant foreign country does not require authorisation for the
fishing under their laws. In those
circumstances, no offence committed if a person uses an Australian-flagged boat
for fishing in those waters.
12.
Section 105C of the Fisheries Management Act relates to any Australian-flagged boat
fishing in any waters of a foreign country whether adjoining
13.
Defence suggests that the fact that no offence
is committed if the person has an authorisation issued under the law of the
relevant foreign country for the fishing entails an impermissible delegation or
abdication of the legislative power of the Commonwealth to a foreign
legislation and is therefore contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution. Defence
points to the potential for the FMA to have a variable operation from time to
time, depending upon the provisions of Indonesian law and the administration of
that law. While I accept that there may be some variation from time to time, in
my view this is also a factual issue which can be dealt with by evidence and
tested by cross-examination. S 105C must
be capable of applicability to all foreign jurisdictions where people can
fish. For that reason, there will be
variable operation as between jurisdictions, as well as from time to time
within each jurisdiction.
14.
Subsection 105C(5) of the FMA was not raised in
submissions. In my view this is a relevant subsection when considering the
preliminary issue. Subsection 5 sets out that there can not be a conviction for
an offence under s105C of the FMA involving the
fishing if the person has been convicted or acquitted in the foreign country of
an offence with respect to the
fishing (my emphasis). Subsection 5 operates to ensure the fishing is not the
subject of successful prosecution in
15.
An element of the offence in s 105C of the FMA
is that the boat used must be an ‘Australian-flagged boat’. An
Australian-flagged boat is defined in s 4 of the FMA as “an Australian
ship as defined in the Shipping
Registration Act 1981 or would be an Australian ship as defined in the Shipping Registration Act 1981 if it
were a ship as defined in that Act”. The Shipping Registration Act 1981 (the SRA) is Commonwealth
legislation which, inter alia, regulates the registration of Australian owned
ships. Section 3 of the SRA says that an Australian-owned ship means a ship
having Australian nationality by virtue of section 29. Section 29 of the SRA
sets out that registered ships and those Australian owned ships referred to in
s 13 of the SRA (and some others not relevant in this case) are taken to be
Australian ships and to have Australian nationality. Every Australian-owned
ship shall be registered under part 2 of the SRA (section 12 of the SRA). Ships
less than 24 metres in tonnage length, Government ships, fishing vessels (my emphasis) and pleasure craft are exempt from
the requirement to be registered under s 12 of the SRA (see s 13 of the SRA).
Fishing vessel is defined in s 3 of the SRA and, without the court making a
formal finding on this question (given that no evidence has been taken as yet),
this definition would appear to include a boat such as the ‘Territory
Spirit’. The SRA then sets out the
national colours and other flags for Australian-flagged ships. If a ship is
registered under the law of a foreign country, it can not be registered as an
Australian ship (s 17 SRA).
16.
The Commonwealth has legislative power to enact
the Shipping Registration Act 1981 by
virtue of section 51(i) of the Constitution – that is the power to make
laws for the peace order and good government of the Commonwealth with respect
to trade and commerce with other countries and among the states and section 98
of the Constitution where the trade and commerce power is expressly stated to
extend to navigation and shipping (as well as another unrelated matter). There
may be other powers which are also relied upon, to empower the Commonwealth to
enact the SRA.
17.
Australian-flagged ships can and do travel
outside of Australian waters to foreign waters and foreign ports. Section 6 of
the SRA sets out that “This Act extends to every external Territory and
to acts, omissions, matters and things outside
18.
While there are inherent responsibilities and
obligations upon the owners and users of Australian-flagged ships, there are
also protections and privileges that attach to the fact that the ship is an
Australian-flagged ship.
19.
I will now consider the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth). The Constitution grants the Commonwealth
Legislature express power with respect to fishing. Section 51 of the
Constitution sets out that “The Parliament shall, subject to this
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government
of the Commonwealth with respect to:- ….
20.
(x.)
Fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial limits”.
21.
The 78B notice pursuant to the Judiciary Act also refers to section 122
of the Constitution, the Territories Power.
22.
Prima facie the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) has been enacted by the
Commonwealth Parliament pursuant to the express power in section 51 (x) of the
Constitution. Section 3 of the FMA sets out the objectives which the Minister
and the AFMA must pursue and subsection (1) of those objectives relates to what
could be described as national objectives. Subsection 2 of the objectives
relate to what could be described as both national and international
objectives.
23.
Fish stocks do not by nature recognise national
and international boundaries. To achieve sustainable management of fish stocks
and ensure orderly regulation of fishing, there must be an international
response. The FMA takes account of international agreements and obligations.
Australian-flagged ships traverse beyond Australian waters. Some of those will be involved in fishing
beyond Australian waters.
24.
If the power in section 51(i) of the
Constitution is not found to be capable of conferring power on the Commonwealth
Legislature to lawfully enact s 105C of the FMA, there are other powers in the
Constitution which can be considered.
Section 105C of the FMA relates to activities outside the Australian
fishing zone. Section 105C of the FMA
could be based upon (in its entirety or in part) the powers granted to the
Commonwealth Legislature by section 51 (xxix) the External Affairs power
– by virtue of international agreements and arrangements made with
respect to fisheries and fish stocks. The power of Trade and Commerce between
other countries and among the states in s 51(i) of the Constitution is another
source of potential power for s 105C of the FMA to be enacted. This power is
also supplemented by s 98 of the Constitution, as set out above. These powers
anticipate international implications of the exercise of Commonwealth
legislative power.
25.
The
26.
The licensing and regulation of fishing through
Commonwealth legislation does not permit or authorise, and arguably cannot
permit or authorise, a person to fish in the waters of a foreign country. As stated, s 105C of the FMA is in the
division entitled ‘Offences in places beyond the AFZ’. Section 105C of the FMA makes it unlawful for
a person who has an Australian-flagged boat that is used for fishing, to fish
in waters of a foreign country unless authorised, provided that the relevant
foreign country requires authorisation. Section 105C of the FMA does not
prohibit fishing outside Australian waters by an Australian-flagged ship.
27.
As the FMA does not prohibit fishing outside
Australian waters by an Australian-flagged ship, it anticipates that fishing
may occur outside Australian waters by an Australian-flagged ship. The
legislation does not purport to directly regulate the fishing but acts as
regulatory safety net to ensure that an Australian-flagged boat is not free to
fish in foreign waters with impunity. The offence in s 105C of the FMA takes
account of both the authorisation and prosecution systems of the foreign
jurisdiction. If it did not, then an Australian-flagged ship could be
indirectly prohibited from fishing in foreign waters, even in circumstances
where they were authorised to fish by the foreign country.
28.
In my view s 105C of the FMA can be
characterised as an offence which relates to fishing by Australian-flagged
ships in waters in foreign waters. It does not relate to fishing by all ships
in foreign waters. The operation of
s105C of the FMA is limited to those ships which are subject to the
responsibilities and obligations and
the protections and privileges of an Australian-flagged ship. If the relevant
foreign country elects to prosecute for an offence with respect to the fishing
by the Australian-flagged ship, then irrespective of the outcome (whether there
is an acquittal or a conviction), there can be no conviction under s 105C of
the FMA involving that fishing (ss 105C(5) of the FMA).
29.
Defence have submitted that there is no
certainty if an offence depends on (in part) the law of a foreign country. It
is accepted that this offence can result in significant penalties. Having said
that, I am of the view that the matters which relate to a foreign country are
factual matters and capable of being made the subject of evidence. Other areas
of Commonwealth law will be impacted upon by the laws of other countries. I
note that in his text Australian Federal
Constitutional Law, Howard expressly refers to the taxation, marriage and
divorce powers in this context.
30.
Defence submitted that the Exclusive Economic
Zone of Indonesia may expand or contract at any time and therefore the criminal
liability of a person will similarly expand or contract. Defence submitted that
this leads to uncertainty which was not consistent with criminal liability. For
the section to work, s 105C must be capable of applicability to all countries
where ships can travel.
31.
Many offences rely upon certain facts or
circumstances being found before the question of liability can be determined.
Those facts and circumstances may vary and change over time. It is accepted
that in this case the facts and circumstances are the subject of foreign
legislation, outside of the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction.
32.
My preliminary view of s 105C of the Fisheries Management Act (Cth) is that the legislation does not confer
legislative power on the foreign country the subject of the alleged offence (in
this case, Indonesia but the same issues apply irrespective of which foreign
country is involved). I must stress that
it is my preliminary view only.
33.
I have considered the question of whether to
state a case to the Supreme Court and it is my view that a stated case is the
more prudent course of action in the circumstances of this matter. A question
can be reserved at any time during a hearing. A stated case can generally be
dealt with speedily. I note that the
alleged facts are now nearly one year old. The first mention of the case did
not come before the Court until 22 June 2009.
Nevertheless there is now some significant delay in the matter and it is
my view that a stated case is a preferable course of action. This question has
not been decided by a superior court. Any ruling made in this court is not
binding on any other court and, while not an everyday occurrence, Northern
Territory Courts regularly hear matters pursuant to the Fisheries Management Act (Cth).
Further, the question may have applicability to other legislation. It is the practice in lower Courts, such as
the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, of avoiding a determination of
constitutional issues. In my view, this
is a matter which is more appropriately dealt with in the Supreme Court of the
34.
In accordance with usual practice I will seek
counsel’s assistance in the drafting of the stated case.
35.
I now publish these reasons.
Dated this 5th
day of January 2010
_________________________
Melanie
J Little
STIPENDIARY
MAGISTRATE